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Efficacy of the Obama Policies to 
Combat Al-Qa’eda, the Taliban, 
and Associated Forces—The First 
Year 
 
Jeffrey F. Addicott 
 
“The views of men can only be known, or guessed at, by their 
words or actions.”1 
 
  George Washington, 1799 
 
When Senator Barack Obama ran for President of the 
United States in the 2008 election against Senator John 
McCain,2 his major campaign slogans were based on a cry for 
“change.”3  Of course, even the novice student of political 
science knows that the promise of change crops up during 
practically every presidential campaign in American history 
 
   Distinguished Professor of Law and Director, Center for Terrorism 
Law, St. Mary‟s University School of Law.  B.A. (with honors), University of 
Maryland; J.D., University of Alabama School of Law; LL.M., The Judge 
Advocate General‟s Legal Center and School; LL.M. (1992) and S.J.D. (1994), 
University of Virginia School of Law.  This article was prepared under the 
auspices of the Center for Terrorism Law located at St. Mary‟s University 
School of Law, San Antonio, Texas.  The author wishes to acknowledge with 
special thanks the superb efforts of research assistants John Hicks and 
Shanna Castro who supported this article with outstanding research and 
editing. 
1. THE QUOTABLE FOUNDING FATHERS 199 (Buckner F. Melton, Jr. ed., 
2004) (statement by George Washington to Patrick Henry, Jan. 15, 1799). 
2. Obama won fifty-three percent—versus McCain‟s forty-six percent—of 
the popular vote; Obama won 365 electoral votes to McCain‟s 173; and 
Obama won twenty-eight states while McCain won twenty-two.  See 
CNN.com, President—Election Center 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/president/ (last visited Feb. 5, 
2010). 
3. Two of Obama‟s campaign slogans were: “Change We Can Believe In” 
and “Change We Need.”  See Presidential Campaign Slogans, 
http://www.presidentsusa.net/campaignslogans.html (last visited Feb. 5, 
2010). 
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and then quickly fades into oblivion once the winner takes 
office.4  In short, there really is no change.  Indeed, in terms of 
dealing with the threat of militant Islam posed by al-Qa‟eda, 
the Taliban, and associated forces, there can be little question 
that in the first year of his presidency, Obama actually 
retained many key Bush Administration policies.  Although his 
efforts to portray his policies as somehow different played well 
with the main-stream media headlines of the day,5 President 
Obama was largely ineffective in setting a clear departure from 
the policies of the Bush Administration.  If anything, Obama 
sowed more confusion than Bush.6  For instance, President 
Obama‟s promised change to provide a so-called “new and 
comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan”7 to 
address the threat of militant Islam took over ten months and 
resulted in the adoption of a Bush-styled “surge” (used in the 
Iraq War) to simply deploy an additional 30,000 troops on the 
ground in Afghanistan.  His campaign-era idea to send 
American troops to Pakistan where the main al-Qa‟eda 
structure has reconstituted never materialized.8 
The purpose of this monograph is to provide a brief 
overview of what President Obama did during his first year in 
office vis-à-vis developing a coherent legal and policy strategy 
 
4. See generally, e.g., JACK W. GERMOND & JULES WITCOVER, MAD AS 
HELL: REVOLT AT THE BALLOT BOX, 1992 (1993) (quoting George H.W. Bush, 
Acceptance Address before the Republican National Convention (Aug. 18, 
1988)).  At the 1988 Republican National Convention, President H.W. Bush 
promised, “Read my lips: no new taxes.”  Id.  Bush subsequently raised taxes 
for the 1990 fiscal year in response to the beginning of a recession. 
5. Deborah Howell, An Obama Tilt in Campaign Coverage, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 9, 2008, at B6 (admitting that there was a distinct media slant towards 
Obama during the campaign, and citing the number of positive stories about 
Obama versus the number of positive stories about McCain).  See also Fox 
News Watch (Fox television broadcast Apr. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,512768,00.html. 
6. See, e.g., John Dickerson, The Fog of War, SLATE, Dec. 1, 2009, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2237100/ (noting that Obama‟s speech detailing 
deployment of more troops while setting a deadline for the withdrawal of 
troops was confusing); Stephen Dinan, Troops Confused, Republicans Say, 
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010, at 5 (indicating Obama‟s policies are confusing to 
deployed troops). 
7. See President Barack Obama, Address to Joint Session of Congress 
(Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-of-
president-barack-obama-address-to-joint-session-of-congress. 
8. See Obama Says He Might Send Troops to Pakistan, MSNBC.COM, 
Aug. 1, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20070536. 
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for dealing with al-Qa‟eda, the Taliban, and associated forces.  
In addition, the article will provide analysis on the efficacy of 
those actions from a national security perspective. 
 
I.  Bush Policies on Al-Qa‟eda, the Taliban,  
and Associated Forces 
 
Following the al-Qa‟eda terror attacks of September 11, 
2001,9 the Bush Administration embarked on a series of 
antiterrorism policy and legal initiatives designed to disrupt 
the Islamic terror organization (and its affiliates) and to 
prevent future terror attacks against the homeland.  Over the 
span of the Bush presidency, a wide variety of sweeping 
changes were instituted, including: the passage of the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
(USAPATRIOT Act);10 the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security;11 the passage of a much strengthened 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act;12 the creation of military 
 
9. On September 11, 2001, 19 members of the radical Islamic terror 
group al-Qa‟eda hijacked four U.S. passenger aircraft while in flight (five 
terrorists each in three of the planes and four in the fourth).  See generally 
Evan Thomas, A New Date of Infamy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 2001, at 22 
(setting out a timeline of events that occurred on September 11, 2001).  The 
Islamic terrorists intentionally crashed two of the planes into the Twin 
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City.  See Terrorists Destroy 
World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon in Raid With Hijacked Jets, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 12, 2001, at A1.  A third plane crashed into the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C., but the fourth plane went down in a field in Pennsylvania, 
most likely as a result of the heroic efforts of some of the passengers.  Id.  
According to a New York Times tally, along with billions of dollars in property 
loss, approximately 3,000 were killed, not including the nineteen terrorists.  
See A Nation Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at A13. 
10. United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USAPATRIOT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).  The bill passed in the Senate by a 
vote of 98-1.  147 CONG. REC. S11059-60 (2001).  The House of 
Representatives passed their version by a vote of 357-66.  147 CONG. REC. 
H7224 (2001). 
11. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 
(2002) (establishing the Department of Homeland Security in response to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, with the purpose of consolidating the 
executive branch organizations related to homeland security under one 
Cabinet level agency). 
12. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 
(2007). 
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commissions;13 and the establishment of a new combatant 
command, the United States Northern Command, in 
Colorado.14  The United States also used military force to 
unseat the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.15  In turn, 
confinement facilities were established to detain certain 
unlawful enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan and other 
parts of the world at Bagram Air Force Base, Afghanistan and 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.16 
In short, understanding that the one-dimensional use of 
the criminal justice system was unable to deal with an ideology 
of religious-based hate able to recruit tens of thousands of 
followers and field terrorist cells throughout the world, the 
Bush Administration employed a combination of traditional 
law enforcement tools, e.g., criminal investigations and federal 
prosecutions, with the more muscular use of military force 
applied under the law of war.17  The most significant and 
 
13. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600, amended by Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 
1801-07, 123 Stat. 2190 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.) 
(creating military commissions, in response to the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006), decision, and with the stated purpose “[t]o authorize trial by 
military commission for violations of the law of war, and for other purposes.”). 
14. About U.S. Northern Command, 
http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) 
(explaining that U.S. Northern Command (“USNORTHCOM”) was 
established on October 1, 2002 in response to the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks). 
15. Philip Smucker et al., The Good, Bad, and Unfinished, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 7, 2002, at 1 (discussing Afghanistan). 
16. See Joint Task Force Guantanamo, http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/ 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2010).  The mission of the U.S. military task force is to 
conduct “safe, humane, legal and transparent care and custody of detainees, 
including those convicted by military commission and those ordered 
released.”  Id.  Bagram Air Force Base is the largest detention facility.  It 
currently holds over 750 people.  See Afghanistan to Take Over Bagram 
Prison, ABCNEWS.NET.AU, Jan. 10, 2010, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/01/10/2789002.htm. 
17. The central international treaty dealing with the law of war or the 
law of armed conflict is the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  The Geneva 
Conventions are set out in four categories: (1) Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; (3) Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/14
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crucial legal development advanced by the Bush 
Administration was the clear view that the conflict with al-
Qa‟eda was a real “war,”18 to be fought not only with the use of 
domestic federal criminal law, but also with the full power of 
the legal rules associated with the law of war.  Among other 
things, the premise that the United States was at war served 
as the justification for the rule of law to designate and then 
detain certain enemy combatants without trial, establish the 
use of military commissions, and interrogate enemy 
combatants. 
 
A. The War on Terror 
 
The first action taken following the September 11 attacks 
was the Bush Administration‟s pronouncement that the United 
 
and (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.  The goal of 
the law of war is to mitigate the accompanying evils of war by: “(a) Protecting 
both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; (b) 
Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the 
hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and 
civilians; and (c) Facilitating the restoration of peace.”  U.S. DEP‟T OF ARMY, 
FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 2 (1956). 
18. Although many trace the origin of al-Qa‟eda‟s declaration of war on 
the United States to 1996 or earlier, the key declaration of war from the 
perspective of the radical Islamic group was made on February 22, 1998, 
when Osama bin Laden and the “World Islamic Front” formally issued a 
religious fatwa urging all Muslims to engage in physical violence against 
“Crusaders and Jews.”  PETER L. BERGEN, THE OSAMA BIN LADEN I KNOW 196 
(2006).  Signed by Sheikh Osama bin-Muhammed bin Laden, Ayman al 
Zawahiri, Abu-Yasir Rifa‟i Ahmad Taha, Sheikh Mir Hamzah, and Fazlur 
Rahman, the declaration proclaimed: 
 
All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans 
are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger, and 
Muslims.  And ulema (clerics) have throughout Islamic 
history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual 
duty if the enemy destroys Muslim countries. 
On that basis, and in compliance with Allah‟s order, we 
issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: 
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—
civilians and military—is an individual duty for every 
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible 
to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [in 
Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip. 
 
Id. 
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States was at “war.”19  In tandem with this determination from 
the Commander in Chief, the phrase “War on Terror” entered 
the lexicon of both the general public and all branches of the 
government, where it remained firmly set for the next seven 
years.20  Although the phrase was not accurate in what it 
purported to describe (terrorism is a tactic, not an entity), it 
certainly met the publicists‟ twin requirements for public 
consumption—it was short and to the point.  Nevertheless, 
unlike the so-called “War on Poverty”21 or “War on Drugs,”22 
the “War on Terror” was never designed to be a metaphor, but 
rather a label for a real war waged under the law of armed 
conflict.23  Just as the phrase “World War II” failed to identify 
the enemy (Germany, Japan, and Italy), so did the phrase “War 
on Terror.”  In other words, if the United States viewed this 
conflict as a real war, who was the enemy?  Obviously, the 
enemy was not all terror groups, of which the United States 
 
19. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of 
Congress and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (stating 
that “On September 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war 
against our country.”). 
20. Some top officials in Bush‟s Cabinet, including Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld, tried to replace the phrase “Global War on Terror” with 
“Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism.”  General Richard Myers, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seemed to agree with the change, citing 
the image of troops as the solution when the situation was coined as a “war.”  
See Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, New Name For “War on Terror” Reflects 
Wider U.S. Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A7.  On August 3, 2005, 
President Bush publicly overrode the attempted change in terminology by 
firmly stating, “[m]ake no mistake about it, we are at war,” and using the 
phrase “War on Terror,” at least five times, but never employing the newly 
coined phrase of his senior administration officials.  See Richard W. 
Stevenson, President Makes It Clear: Phrase is “War on Terror”, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 4, 2005, at A12 (quoting George W. Bush, Address at the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (Aug. 3, 2001)). 
21. Special Message to the Congress Proposing a Nationwide War on the 
Sources of Poverty, 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 375, 375-80 (Mar. 16, 1964) 
(transcript of Lyndon Johnson‟s declaration of The War on Poverty). 
22. On July 14, 1969, President Richard Nixon identified drug abuse as 
a “serious national threat” in a special message to Congress.  Special Message 
to the Congress on Control of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 1969 PUB. 
PAPERS 513, 513 (July 14, 1969).  Two years later, in June 1971, he declared 
“war” on drugs, characterizing drug addiction as “public enemy number one.”  
Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control, 1971 PUB. PAPERS 738, 738 (June 17, 1971). 
23. See Joint Task Force Guantanamo, supra note 16.  The law of war is 
also known as the law of armed conflict. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/14
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has currently designated only forty-four as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations.24  Further, the enemy was not all Islamic terror 
groups either, of which there were scores, including the very 
large terror organizations of Hamas25 and Hizballah.26 
The U.S. Congress rapidly identified the enemy in the 
“War on Terror” as all those “nations, organizations, or 
persons”27 responsible for the September 11 attacks.  As such, 
on September 14, 2001, Congress voted unanimously (save one 
Congresswoman from California)28 to authorize the President 
to use armed force against those “he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” against 
the United States.29  Shortly thereafter, on September 20, 
2001, President Bush issued an Address to Congress and the 
American people citing al-Qa‟eda and the nations that support 
that “radical network of terrorists” as the enemies in the 
United States‟s War on Terror.30 
Prior to the 2003 American-led military campaign against 
Iraq, the Bush Administration attempted to expand the 
meaning of the phrase “War on Terror” to include those rogue 
States who posed a threat to the United States by means of 
possessing or seeking to possess weapons of mass destruction.  
For instance, in 2002, President Bush said: “[t]he United States 
of America will not permit the world‟s most dangerous regimes 
to threaten us with the world‟s most destructive weapons.”31  
 
24. The Secretary of State, in accordance with federal law, is required to 
provide an annual report to Congress on terrorism, to include the designation 
of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).  22 U.S.C. § 2656(f) (2006).  The 
most current Country Reports on Terrorism was published on April 30, 2009 
and identified forty-four terrorist groups.  U.S. DEP‟T OF STATE, COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2008, at 283-84 (2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf. 
25. U.S. DEP‟T OF STATE, supra note 24. 
26. Id. at 283, 296-97, 299-301. 
27. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 
115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)). 
28. Congresswoman Barbara Lee of California voted “nay.”  147 CONG. 
REC. H5683 (2001).  Ten others did not cast votes.  Id. 
29. 115 Stat. at 224. 
30. See President George W. Bush, Address, supra note 19. 
31. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 
2002), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.  See also 
David E. Sanger, Bush, Focusing on Terrorism, Says Secure U.S. is Top 
Priority, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at A1. 
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Most certainly, the 2003 war with Saddam Hussein‟s Iraq was 
waged with this maxim in mind.32  Still, with the end of the 
international armed conflict in Iraq, the War on Terror settled 
back to its more limited meaning, to serve as the description of 
the ongoing global armed conflict between the United States of 
America and al-Qa‟eda, the Taliban, and associated forces.33  
Congress specifically codified this definition of the enemy with 
the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006.34  While the 
combat activities in Iraq and Afghanistan after the summer of 
2003 did not constitute armed conflict with a specific State,35 
 
32. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution 
of 2002, Pub. L. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498, 1498-99 (2002) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1541 (2006)).  The Authorization cited many factors to justify the use of 
military force against Iraq, including that alleged weapons of mass 
destruction and programs to develop such weapons posed a “threat to the 
national security of the United States,” id. at 1498, and Iraq‟s “capability and 
willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its 
own people,” id. at 1499. 
33. See President George W. Bush, Address, supra note 19 (“Our war on 
terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”). 
34. In the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Congress specifically 
defined unlawful enemy combatants to include: 
 
[A] person who has engaged in hostilities or who has 
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against 
the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful 
enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the 
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or . . . a person who, 
before, on, or after the date of enactment of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an 
unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under 
the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense. 
 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 
2600, 2601, amended by Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
84, §§ 1801-07, 123 Stat. 2190 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a). 
35. The actual period of a state of international armed conflict in both 
military engagements was measured in months.  The military campaign 
against the Taliban regime took approximately three months, from October 7, 
2001 until December 22, 2001, when Hamid Karzai took control of 
Afghanistan as Chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority.  See U.S. Dep‟t of 
State, Background Note: Afghanistan, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).  The 
military campaign against Saddam Hussein‟s Iraq took less than two months, 
from March 20, 2003 to May 1, 2003, when President Bush declared an end to 
major combat operations in Iraq on the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln.  See Bush 
Declares Victory in Iraq, BBCNEWS.COM, May 2, 2003, 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/14
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U.S. policy continued to require that its armed forces abide by 
the spirit and principles of the law of war on all military 
contingency operations.36 
 
B. Designating and Detaining Enemy Combatants 
 
In conjunction with the War on Terror, the Bush 
Administration designated certain individuals as enemy 
combatants and detained them indefinitely.  Under the law of 
armed conflict, an enemy combatant—whether lawful or 
unlawful—can be held indefinitely until the war is over.37  The 
purpose of detention is not penal in nature, but necessary to 
keep the enemy combatant from rejoining enemy forces and 
continuing to fight. 
The Bush Administration determined that the al-Qa‟eda 
and Taliban fighters were not lawful enemy combatants, and 
hence not eligible for Prisoner of War (POW) status under the 
Third Geneva Convention.38  Since al-Qa‟eda fighters belonged 
to a terrorist organization and were not recognized members of 
an armed force, they were deemed unlawful belligerents.39  The 
 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2989459.stm. 
36. U.S. DEP‟T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5100.77: DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM 
(1998), available at 
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/pdf2/d510077p.pdf (replaced by 
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2311.01E: DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (2006), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/rtf/231101x.rtf). 
37. Traditional law of war authority allows the government to hold 
enemy combatants until the end of hostilities.  See Geneva Convention III, 
supra note 17, art. 118. 
38. See supra note 34 (providing the Military Commissions Act definition 
of “unlawful enemy combatant.”  The Act also defined a lawful enemy 
combatant as a person who is: 
 
[A] member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in 
hostilities against the United States; . . . a member of a 
militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance movement 
belonging to a State party engaged in such hostilities, which 
are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive 
sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and 
abide by the law of war; or . . . a member of a regular armed 
force who professes allegiance to a government engaged in 
such hostilities, but not recognized by the United States. 
 
120 Stat. at 2601. 
39. U.S. DEP‟T OF ARMY, supra note 17, ¶ 60(b) (indicating that “[p]ersons 
9
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Administration determined that captured Taliban fighters 
were likewise not entitled to POW status under the Third 
Geneva Convention, in part because of their failure to comply 
with the Convention‟s applicable provisions of international 
law.40 
Throughout the Bush Administration‟s tenure, the 
Supreme Court never overturned the premise that the United 
States was engaged in a state of war with al-Qa‟eda, the 
Taliban, and associated forces.  Therefore, the United States 
was entitled to detain such fighters as enemy combatants.41  
The Court instead considered narrow issues dealing with 
status and review processes applicable to detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay.  The Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
that, although the detainees were not entitled to POW status, 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did in fact apply 
to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.42  In 2008, a bitterly 
divided (5-4) Supreme Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that 
aliens designated as enemy combatants and detained at 
Guantanamo Bay had the constitutional privilege of habeas 
corpus review of the legality, as well as possibly the 
circumstances, of their detentions.43  Significantly, then, the 
question to the federal district court is whether there is enough 
evidence for the government to designate a particular detainee 
 
who are not members of the armed forces, as defined in [the Geneva 
Conventions], who bear arms or engage in other conduct hostile to the enemy 
thereby deprive themselves of many of the privileges attaching to the 
members of the civilian population”). 
40. Under the Third Geneva Convention, POW status is only conferred 
on persons who are “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict” 
or “[m]embers of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, 
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party . . . 
provided that such . . . fulfill” four conditions: “that of being commanded by a 
person responsible for his subordinates; . . . that of having a fixed distinctive 
sign recognizable at a distance; . . . that of carrying arms openly; [and] that of 
conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”  
Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, art. 4(a)(1)-(2).  The fourth and final 
condition “require[s] lawful combatants to wear distinctive military insignia, 
i.e., uniforms which would make them distinguishable from the civilian 
population at a distance.”  Jeffrey F. Addicott, Legal and Policy Implications 
For a New Era: The “War on Terror”, 4 SCHOLAR 209, 240 (2002). 
41. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (approving the 
detention of enemy combatants). 
42. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
43. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/14
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as an enemy combatant.44  As in all previous decisions 
associated with the enemy combatant issue, the Supreme Court 
did not rule that the government had no authority to detain 
enemy combatants; it held only that detainees had the right of 
civilian review of their designation as enemy combatants.45 
 
C. Military Commissions and Federal Courts 
 
Military commissions are non-Article III courts.  They 
derive their authority from Congress‟s power to “define and 
punish . . . [o]ffenses against the Law of Nations.”46  
Historically, military commissions have been used in a variety 
of settings when related to war.47  The main benefit for the 
government is that the rules of evidence are relaxed to allow 
for the exigencies of war, e.g., hearsay may be admissible and 
evidentiary chain of custody rules are relaxed.48  Although the 
Bush Administration moved quickly to establish military 
commissions in 2001 under Article II of the Constitution,49 the 
Supreme Court‟s 2006 ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld struck 
down the President‟s authority to establish military 
commissions to try illegal enemy combatants, and strongly 
indicated that such a special court had to be created by 
Congress, not the President.50  That same year, Congress 
responded to the Hamdan decision by passing the MCA, which 
specifically authorized the creation of military commissions to 
try unlawful enemy combatants for a variety of criminal 
offenses, including war crimes.51  Under the Bush 
 
44. See id. 
45. Id. 
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
47. See Eugene R. Fidell, The Trouble With Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, June 
14, 2009, at WK8. 
48. See Press Release, Duncan Hunter, House Armed Servs. Comm., 
Floor Statement on the Military Commissions Act (Sept. 27, 2006), available 
at http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/pressreleases/9-27-
06HunterFloorStatement.pdf. 
49. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
50. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591-92 (2006) (citing Ex parte 
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)). 
51. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600, amended by Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 
1801-07, 123 Stat. 2190 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.). 
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Administration, three al-Qa‟eda fighters were tried and 
sentenced by military commissions.52 
The Bush Administration also utilized federal criminal 
courts to prosecute members of al-Qa‟eda, including Zacarias 
Moussaoui, the so-called twentieth terrorist in the 9/11 
attacks,53 and shoe bomber Richard Reid.54  Clearly, the Bush 
Administration‟s use of the federal criminal court system to try 
some al-Qa‟eda members, and not others, undermined the 
argument that the law of war was fully operational and that 
military commissions were the appropriate framework for 
prosecuting al-Qa‟eda terrorists.  Nevertheless, the discrepancy 
 
52. David Hicks made a plea bargain prior to trial on March 26, 2007.  
Record of Trial at 513-20, United States v. Hicks (Military Comm‟n, Apr. 19, 
2007), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2007/US%20v%20David%20Hicks%20ROT
%20%28Redacted%29.pdf.  Salim Hamdan was found guilty of terrorism 
charges, Transcript of Record at 3942, United States v. Hamdan (Military 
Comm‟n, Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/22-24-
part%201-Ham-5-7%20Aug%2008-FINAL-pgs%203891-
4014%20Redacted.pdf, and then sentenced by a U.S. military jury to five and 
one-half years on August 7, 2008, id. at 4174 available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/22-24-part%203-Ham-5-7%20Aug%2008-
FINAL-pgs-4113-4182Redacted.pdf (ordering a sentence of 66 months).  Ali 
Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul was convicted of terrorism war crimes by a 
military commission and sentenced to life in prison on November 3, 2008.  
See NYTimes.com, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul—The Guantanamo 
Docket, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/39-ali-hamza-
ahmad-suliman-al-bahlul#1 (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
53. Zacarias Moussaoui entered a guilty plea to charges that he 
conspired to hijack planes and fly them into the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon.  Trial Order, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. 
2005).  See also United States v. Moussaoui, No. 06-4494, 2010 WL 9953, at 
*1-9 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 2010) (discussing the procedural history); Moussaoui 
Pleads Guilty to Terror Charges, CNN.COM, Apr. 23, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/04/22/moussaoui/index.html.  At the 
sentencing stage of the three-year federal trial, a jury sentenced Moussaoui 
to life in prison without the possibility of parole instead of the death penalty, 
which the government was seeking.  See Moussaoui, 2010 WL 9953, at *9-12.  
See also Moussaoui Formally Sentenced, Still Defiant, MSNBC.COM, May 4, 
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12615601/. 
54. Richard Reid was convicted of attempting to blow up American 
Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001 with a 
makeshift bomb in his shoe.  Trial Order, United States v. Reid, No. 02-cr-
10013 (D. Mass. 2008).  He was convicted of multiple life sentences in a 
federal district court in December 2003.  See id.  See also United States v. 
Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 619-20 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing the procedural history); 
Exchange Between Reid, Judge Follows Life Sentence, CNN.COM, Dec. 6, 
2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/30/shoebomber.sentencing/. 
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could be partially justified because neither Moussaoui nor Reid 
was ever classified as an “enemy combatant.”  In fact, scores of 
radical Islamic terrorists that did not qualify as enemy 
combatants have been tried in federal courts since 9/11.55 
 
D. Interrogation of Detainees 
 
In terms of questioning detainees, the precise meaning of 
“enemy combatant” was pivotal for the Bush Administration.  
Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention provides that POWs 
are only required to give their “surname, first names and rank, 
date of birth, and army regimental, personal or serial number, 
or failing this, equivalent information.”56  POWs are not 
required to give any further information.57 
Since the Bush Administration determined that the Third 
Geneva Convention did not apply to the detainees, American 
authorities were entitled to conduct interrogations so long as 
they did not involve torture or ill-treatment.58  With the 
passage of the Detainee Treatment Act in 2005, additional 
uniform standards for interrogations were set out which 
expressly prohibited cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of 
detainees in the custody of any U.S. agency.59  Then, in 2006, 
the Supreme Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did in fact apply to the 
detainees, and that it protected them from violence, outrages 
 
55. See, e.g., Jena Baker McNeill & James Jay Carafano, Terrorist 
Watch: 23 Plots Foiled Since 9/11, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, July 2, 2009, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg2294.cfm. 
56. Geneva Convention III, supra note 17, art. 17. 
57. Article 17 provides the following: “[n]o physical or mental torture, 
nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure 
from them information of any kind whatever.  Prisoners of war who refuse to 
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or 
disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
58. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th 
Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter 
Convention Against Torture] (setting forth the standards of treatment for all 
persons and the universal rejection of “torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world”).  The convention 
provides a clear definition of torture, although it is lacking any definition of 
“other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”  See id. 
59. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-06, 
119 Stat. 2680, 2739-43 (2005). 
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on personal dignity, torture, and cruel, humiliating or 
degrading treatment.60 
On September 5, 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
issued new military detainee and terror suspect treatment 
guidelines.61  In announcing the new rules, President Bush 
revealed that fourteen “high value” terror suspects had been 
transferred from undisclosed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
locations to Guantanamo Bay.62  Further, the Bush 
Administration denied that any of the CIA detainees were 
subjected to interrogation techniques that had violated 
international or domestic law.63  The so-called “waterboarding” 
interrogation technique, used repeatedly on three al-Qa‟eda 
detainees in the CIA program, was determined to constitute a 
level of force that did not rise to the level of torture under the 
Torture Convention.64  On July 20, 2007, President Bush issued 
Executive Order 13,440, which provided interpretation of 
Common Article 3 provisions as applied to interrogations 
conducted by the CIA.65 
 
II. Obama Policies on Al-Qa‟eda, the Taliban,  
and Associated Forces 
 
President Obama‟s expressed desire to dismantle key 
elements of the Bush policies vis-à-vis al-Qa‟eda, the Taliban, 
and associated forces began only days after taking the oath of 
office.  Instead of creating an interagency task force to conduct 
a detailed study of all viable options and recommendations on 
how best to proceed in the War on Terror, the President issued 
 
60. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631-32 (2006). 
61. U.S. DEP‟T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2310.01E, DOD DETAINEE PROGRAM 
(2006), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231001p.pdf. 
62. See David Sanger, President Moves 14 Held in Secret to 
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1. 
63. See What Went Wrong: Torture and the Office of the Legal Counsel in 
the Bush Administration: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Jeffrey F. Addicott, Professor of Law, 
Center for Terrorism Law, St. Mary‟s University School of Law), 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3842&wit_id=7904. 
64. See, e.g., id. (arguing that waterboarding as practiced by the CIA did 
not constitute torture under the Torture Convention). 
65. Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007). 
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executive orders mandating, what were billed as, sweeping 
changes in policy, and then established an interagency task 
force to study the consequences of his directives.  In three 
executive orders issued on January 22, 2009, the President 
ordered: (1) the closure of Guantanamo Bay within one year;66 
(2) the suspension of all ongoing military commissions;67 and 
(3) the suspension of the CIA‟s enhanced interrogation 
program.68  Ironically, within one year of the announcement, 
two of the executive orders would be, for all practical purposes, 
functionally nullified. 
 
A. Overseas Contingency Operations 
 
Wishing to establish a new theme to describe the conflict 
with al-Qa‟eda, the Taliban, and associated forces, President 
Obama took aim at the phrase most associated with President 
Bush‟s overall framework for dealing with the threat of al-
Qa‟eda-styled terrorism69—the War on Terror.70  The new 
phrase offered by the Obama Administration to describe the 
threat of al-Qa‟eda transnational terrorism was the decidedly 
sterile “Overseas Contingency Operations.”71 
 
66. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009).  See 
also Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009) (establishing a 
special task force on detainee disposition). 
67. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 72 Fed. Reg. at 4899. 
68. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
69. See generally JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW: MATERIALS, CASES, 
COMMENTS (5th ed. 2008). 
70. See Daniel Dombey & Edward Luce, “Global War on Terror” Out of 
Lexicon, FIN. TIMES (London), June 30, 2009, at 4 (quoting Secretary of 
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, who confirmed that “War on Terror” is 
not used because it “does not describe properly the nature of the terrorist 
threat to the US”). 
71. This phrase was first used in a memo to Pentagon staff members in 
late March 2009, which stated, “this administration prefers to avoid using the 
term „Long War‟ or „Global War on Terror‟ [GWOT.]  Please use „Overseas 
Contingency Operation.‟”  Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, “Global War on Terror” 
is Given New Name, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2009, at A4.  For roughly a month 
prior to the memo, senior administration officials had been publicly using the 
latter phrase, including Peter Orszag, Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget, in reference to Obama‟s budget proposal (“The budget shows the 
combined cost of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and any other overseas 
contingency operations that may be necessary.”), and Assistant Secretary of 
the Air Force for Manpower, Craig W. Duehring (“Key battlefield monetary 
incentives has allowed the Air Force to meet the demands of overseas 
15
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Taken from the dictionary of military terminology,72 
Section 101 of Title ten of the United States Code describes the 
phrase as follows: 
 
The term “contingency operation” means a 
military operation that— 
(A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense 
as an operation in which members of the armed 
forces are or may become involved in military 
actions, operations, or hostilities against an 
enemy of the United States or against an 
opposing military force; or 
(B) results in the call or order to, retention 
on, active duty of members of the uniformed 
services . . . during a war or during a national 
emergency declared by the President or 
Congress.73 
 
Overseas contingency operations are also known as 
military operations other than war (MOOTW), and can 
encompass a wide range of actions to include: arms control, 
combating terrorism, Department of Defense support to 
counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions and maritime 
intercept operations, enforcement of exclusion zones, ensuring 
freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, 
military support to civilian authorities, nation assistance and 
support to counterinsurgencies, noncombat evacuation 
operations, peace operations, protection of shipping operations, 
recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and raids, 
and support to insurgencies.74 
 
contingency operations even as requirements continue to grow.”).  Id. 
72. DOD Dictionary of Military Action and Associated Terms, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/ (follow “C,” “contingency 
operation”) (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
73. 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13) (2006). 
74. U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR: 
J-7 OPERATION PLANS AND INTEROPERABILITY DIRECTORATE 16-27 (1995), 
available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jrm/mootw.pdf.  Military operations other 
than war (MOOTW) is the use of military capabilities for operations that fall 
short of actual war.  These operations “focus on deterring war, resolving 
conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to 
domestic crisis.”  Id. at 2.  There are six basic principles to MOOTW: 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/14
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If Bush‟s “War on Terror” was considered to be non-
descriptive by critics, Obama‟s “Overseas Contingency 
Operations” was both over- and non-descriptive at the same 
time.  Predictably, the shelf life of the phrase “Overseas 
Contingency Operations” was measured in days and provided a 
lightning rod for those who believed that Obama was naïve or 
disoriented to the reality of the threat.75  More importantly, 
however, the phrase was an abject rule of law failure because it 
did not include the word “war,” the most critical element of all.  
Indeed, the very rule of law tools that the Obama 
Administration used during its first year  in office—the use of 
deadly force by the military in combat (to include “drone” air 
strikes), the labeling of enemy combatants, the detention of 
said combatants without criminal charges, etc.—could only be 
conducted in a time of war.  As such, Secretary of Homeland 
Security Janet Napolitano‟s remarks that the phrase “War on 
Terror” was abandoned because “[i]n some respects „war‟ is too 
limiting,”76 were grossly inaccurate.  Without question, the use 
of the law of war expands, not restricts, the available legal 
powers necessary to deal with al-Qa‟eda terrorism.77 
Historically, all labels for all wars that America has fought 
have included the word “war.”  This is a fundamental 
ingredient that provides the clearest signal that the nation is 
using the law of war and not operating outside the rule of law.  
In addition, from a public relations standpoint, Obama signaled 
added consternation to the American people: parents are more 
likely to understand that their son died in a war, rather than in 
an overseas contingency operation.78  It was not until January 
 
objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.  Id. 
at 10. 
75. See Joe Queenan, War By Any Other Name, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 
2009, at A15.  See also Judson Berger, What’s in a Name?  Re-Branding 
Madness Consumes Washington, FOXNEWS.COM, May 18, 2009, 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/14/whats-branding-madness-
consumes-washington; Posting of Kailash Srinivasan to Policy Farm Team 
blog of the Roosevelt Institution, 
http://rooseveltinstitution.wordpress.com/2009/04/14/obama%E2%80%99s-
obfuscations-or-what-a-%E2%80%9Coverseas-contingency-
operation%E2%80%9D-can-tell-us-about-the-modern-political-
landscape/#more-834 (Apr. 14, 2009, 17:00 EST). 
76. Dombey & Luce, supra note 70. 
77. See Press Release, Duncan Hunter, supra note 48. 
78. The Obama Administration has faced criticism for using the phrases 
17
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7, 2010, that President Obama produced a truly unequivocal 
statement that the U.S. was at “[W]ar against al-Qa‟eda.”79  
Paradoxically, this statement was made only after the intense 
criticism of the Obama Administration following the arrest of 
al-Qa‟eda member Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab for trying to 
detonate an explosive device on a U.S. aircraft on Christmas 
Day 2009.80 
 
B. Designating and Detaining Enemy Combatants 
 
At one time, Guantanamo Bay had a peak population of 
over 700 detainees from approximately 40 countries, with 
Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Yemen the most represented.  
When President Bush left office in January 2009, around 250 
detainees remained.81  The individuals still held there during 
President Obama‟s first year in office were detained under the 
same legal theory used by President Bush: under the law of 
war, they were detained as enemy combatants until either 
hostilities ceased or specific charges were levied against them 
in a military commission or, if they were U.S. citizens (like al-
Qa‟eda member Jose Padilla),82 in a federal court.83  As of 
 
“Overseas Contingency Operations” and the Orwellian-sounding “man-caused 
disasters,” in place of, respectively, the “War on Terror” and “acts of 
terrorism.”  Queenan, supra note 75.  Newly appointed Department of 
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano explained to the German 
news site, Spiegel Online, why she never used the word “terrorism” in her 
first testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security:  “In my 
speech, although I did not use the word „terrorism,‟ I referred to „man-caused‟ 
disasters.  That is perhaps only a nuance, but it demonstrates that we want 
to move away from the politics of fear toward a policy of being prepared for 
all risks that can occur.”  Interview by Cordula Meyer with Janet Napolitano, 
U.S. Sec‟y of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 16, 2009) 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,613330,00.html. 
79. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on 
Strengthening Intelligence and Aviation Security (Jan. 7, 2010), available at 
2010 WL 40113 (“We are at war.  We are at war against al Qaeda, a far-
reaching network of violence and hatred that attacked us on 9/11, that killed 
nearly 3,000 innocent people, and that is plotting to strike us again.  And we 
will do whatever it takes to defeat them.”). 
80. See Mimi Hall, Obama Orders Security Upgrade, USA TODAY, Jan. 8-
10, 2010, at 1A. 
81. See Brazil May Take Guantanamo Bay Detainees, FOXNEWS.COM, 
Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,504117,00.html. 
82. Padilla was convicted in a Florida federal court in 2008.  Trial Order, 
United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR-COOKE (S.D. Fla. 2008), 2008 WL 
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January 2010, just under 200 detainees remain at the facility.84 
Strangely, while President Obama was unwilling for most 
of his first year in office to publicly and unequivocally call the 
conflict with al-Qa‟eda a “war,” his Administration early on 
vigorously argued before the federal district court in Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates85 that the conflict was in fact a war and that 
the Executive branch was entitled to detain indefinitely al-
Qa‟eda, Taliban, and associated enemy forces in Bagram Air 
Force Base, Afghanistan under the 2001 Congressional 
Authorization for Use of Military Force.86  The only interesting 
legal difference advanced during the first year was the Obama 
Administration‟s weak attempt to subjectively distinguish 
between providing “support” and “substantial support” to al-
Qa‟eda, the Taliban, and associated enemy forces.  Predictably, 
this distinction rang empty with at least two federal judges.87 
 
6124604. 
83. See Washingtonpost.com, Guantanamo Bay Timeline, 
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/timeline/ (last visited Feb. 5, 
2010) (“[A] three judge panel then decides whether the detainee is an enemy 
combatant or if he is releasable.”). 
84. Donna Miles, Morrell: U.S. Security Paramount in Detainee 
Determinations, DEP‟T OF DEF. DOC., Jan. 6, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 
320521.  See also Posting of Michael Isikoff to Newsweek‟s Declassified blog, 
http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/declassified/archive/2010/01/06/guantanamo-
is-not-ever-going-to-be-closed.aspx (Jan. 6, 2010, 12:50 EST). 
85. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), granting 
stay, granting motion to cert., 604 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009). 
86. The statute states: 
 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against 
the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. 
 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 
224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)). 
87. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75-77 (D.D.C. 2009); 
Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 2d 24, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2009).  In both cases the 
judges refused to accept the proposed differentiation of “support” versus 
“substantially supported.”  In the words of Judge Walton, 
 
Replacing a standard that authorizes the detention of 
individuals who “support” an enemy organization with a 
standard that permits the detention of individuals who 
19
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In turn, President Obama‟s desire to close the detention 
facility at Guantanamo Bay never happened.  In part, Obama‟s 
strong desire to close the facility met with a firestorm of 
opposition from the American people, including his own 
Democrat Party.  Not only did the Democrat-controlled 
Congress refuse to provide the Obama Administration with the 
$80 million it requested to close the facility, but Congress also 
placed numerous caveats on when, where, and how the 
President could transfer detainees, particularly if he wished to 
send them to the United States.88 
 
C. Military Commissions and Federal Courts 
 
On June 8, 2009, President Obama first indicated that he 
intended to reverse course from his January 2009 Executive 
Order halting military commissions and would restart the 
process for alleged al-Qa‟eda enemy combatant war criminals.89  
Of course, military commissions are only illegal unless the 
nation is, or has been, in a state of armed conflict under the 
law of war.90  On the other hand, President Obama was quick 
to repeat and actually advance the Bush Administration‟s 
confusion regarding the appropriate judicial forum to prosecute 
al-Qa‟eda enemy combatants for their crimes.  Obama first did 
 
“substantially support” that enemy doubtless strikes the 
casual reader as a distinction of purely metaphysical 
difference, particularly when the government declines to 
provide any definition as to what the qualifier “substantial” 
means. 
 
Mattan, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 26 n.3 (quoting Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 
2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009)). 
88. Shailagh Murray, Senate Demands Plan For Detainees, WASH. POST, 
May 20, 2009, at A1.  See also Dafna Linzer & Peter Finn, White House 
Weighs Order on Detention, WASH. POST, June 27, 2009, at A1 (explaining 
that the appropriations bill signed by President Obama “forces the 
administration to report to Congress before moving any detainee out of 
Guantanamo and prevents the White House from using available funds to 
move detainees onto U.S. soil”). 
89. The Obama Administration is contemplating multiple changes to the 
previous administration‟s use of military commissions, one of which would 
allow terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay to enter guilty pleas without going 
to trial.  See Cam Simpson, White House Plan Would Let Terror Suspects 
Plead Guilty, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2009, at A4. 
90. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006). 
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this by directing the June 2009 transfer from Guantanamo Bay 
of one enemy combatant al-Qa‟eda member to stand trial in 
New York federal district court to face murder charges for his 
role in the al-Qa‟eda terrorist bombings in Africa in 1998.91  
Then, in November 2009, the Obama Administration made the 
strange decision to prosecute Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and 
four other senior al-Qa‟eda leaders in federal court in New 
York City.92  While President Bush could somewhat mask his 
confused decision about applying the proper rule of law to 
enemy combatants by asserting that the al-Qa‟eda members 
that he had sent to federal district court—Zacarias Moussaoui 
and Richard Reid—had not been formally labeled as enemy 
combatants,93 President Obama could not.  All five of the al-
Qa‟eda members slated for trial in New York had been 
detained for years as enemy combatants.  In addition, to make 
matters even more confusing, the announcement by the Obama 
Administration, disclosing that five enemy combatant (now 
termed “unprivileged enemy belligerent” by the 
Administration)94 al-Qa‟eda members—including Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed—would be tried in federal district court, 
came in tandem with the announcement that another five 
enemy combatant al-Qa‟eda members held at Guantanamo Bay 
would be tried by military commissions, caused a firestorm of 
debate and confusion.95 
 
91. Ahmed Ghailani was transferred to a New York District Court on 
June 9, 2009, despite bipartisan opposition in Congress.  Peter Finn, 
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Brought to U.S. for Trial, WASH. POST, June 10, 
2009, at A1.  This was the first case of a non-American detainee from 
Guantanamo Bay transferred to U.S. soil to stand trial.  Id.  Ghailani pleaded 
not guilty to multiple charges in connection with the 1998 embassy bombings 
in Tanzania and Kenya.  Transcript of Record, United States v. Ghailani, No. 
98 Crim. 1023(LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  See also United States v. Ghailani, No. 
98 Crim. 1023(LAK), 2009 WL 3853799 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2009) (discussing 
the procedural history); Finn, supra. 
92. See Prosecuting Terror, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 17, 2009, at 20A. 
93. See supra notes 54-55. 
94. Section 1801 of the Military Commissions Act of 2009 uses the term 
“unprivileged enemy belligerents” in place of “unlawful enemy combatants.”  
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1801, 123 Stat. 2190, 
2574-75 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a).  Although the language drops 
“the Taliban” and “associated forces,” it specifically lists al-Qa‟eda as an 
unprivileged enemy belligerent.  Id. at 2575. 
95. See Morning Meeting with Dylan Ratigan (MSNBC television 
broadcast Nov. 13, 2009) available at http://www.stmarytx.edu/ctl/ (television 
interview with Professor Jeffrey Addicott discussing the five al-Qa‟eda 
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D. Interrogation of Detainees 
 
President Obama made great fanfare of his January 2009 
Executive Order halting CIA interrogations.96  However, the 
CIA‟s high value al-Qa‟eda detainees had long since been 
released and President Bush‟s 2007 Executive Order had 
already halted interrogation techniques that violated Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.97  President Obama‟s 
order was not a departure from the policy that was already in 
effect; DOD rules apply to all interrogations.98 
In reality, the most perplexing interrogation issue aired by 
the Obama Administration revolved around the waterboarding 
of three senior al-Qa‟eda members in CIA custody under the 
Bush Administration.  President Obama publicly asserted that 
waterboarding was torture but then refused to take any 
criminal action against those who authorized or carried out the 
technique.99  Obama placed his Administration and himself in 
violation of international law because he was required under 
Article 7 of the Torture Convention to either extradite the 
alleged torturer or “submit the case to . . . competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”100  He refused to do 
either. 
 
 
members to be tried in federal district court). 
96. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
97. Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007). 
98. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4894. 
99. CIA Employees Won’t be Tried for Waterboarding, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 
17, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30249847 (explaining that President 
Obama has told CIA operatives who engaged in waterboarding of suspected 
al-Qa‟eda terrorists that they will not be prosecuted). 
100. Convention Against Torture, supra note 58, at 198.  Article 2 of the 
Torture Convention absolutely excludes the notion of exceptional 
circumstances to serve as an excuse for torture.  “No exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a 
justification of torture.”  Id. at 197. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/14
362 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
III.  Conclusion 
 
“We are at war.  We are at war with al-Qa’eda.”101 
 
 Barack Obama 
 
While other radical Islamic terrorists must be processed by 
domestic criminal law,102 the War on Terror is a real war 
against al-Qa‟eda, the Taliban, and associated forces.  As the 
Commander in Chief, it is imperative that President Obama 
communicate this fact with clarity to the American people and 
the world.  Only then will he be able to provide clear and 
decisive leadership by matching the correct rule of law words 
with the proper deeds.  Acting in accordance with the new 
discipline of “lawfare,”103 legal clarity mandates that the 
President voice fewer platitudes about “change,” particularly 
given the fact that, like all wars, it is not solely a matter of 
putting “steel on target,” i.e., killing the enemy; it is a 
propaganda effort as well. 
Unfortunately, President Obama‟s first year in office has 
been rubricated by confusion and frustration in a desire to 
somehow change Bush Administration policies.  For instance, 
the Obama Administration‟s refusal to irrevocably and sternly 
tell the public that the conflict with al-Qa‟eda terrorist forces 
was a “war” contrasted sharply with his simultaneous 
argument in federal court that al-Qa‟eda fighters were in fact 
illegal enemy combatants subject to the law of war.  This lack 
of clarity only provided fuel for America‟s enemies to 
perpetuate the false propaganda that the United States was 
acting illegally by, for example, detaining people without trial 
 
101. President Barack Obama, Remarks, supra note 79. 
102. As of the middle of November 2009, the confusion factor in the 
Obama Administration continued to multiply.  President Obama had not yet 
produced a military strategy for Afghanistan and he refused to admit that 
the terror attack at Fort Hood, Texas, by Nidal Malik Hasan—the first 
significant terror attack in the United States since 9/11—was an act of 
Islamic terrorism.  See Nancy Gibb, Terrified . . . Or Terrorist?, TIME, Nov. 23, 
2009, at 26; Joe Klein, The Mystery of the Surge, TIME, Nov. 23, 2009, at 25. 
103. See generally Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 
21st-Century Conflicts?, 54 JOINT FORCE Q. 34 (2009) (arguing that leaders 
must appreciate the role that “lawfare” has to play in terms of the 
propaganda side of armed conflict). 
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in Guantanamo Bay. 
Leadership skills rooted in the panacea of dialogue and a 
“see where it takes us”104 approach in terms of national security 
are disastrous when confronting totalitarian fanatics.  If the 
events of 9/11 have taught Americans anything, it is that the 
United States must operate under the law of war against those 
individual al-Qa‟eda Islamic terrorists designated as enemy 
combatants.  President Obama must put aside political 
partisanship and forcefully acknowledge the manifest fact that 
America is at war, and then institutionalize comprehensive 
policies that are fully rooted in the context of the law of war, 
not domestic criminal law.  Many of these laws of war 
foundational policies—detaining enemy combatants, military 
commissions, interrogation—were developed during the Bush 
years and require only slight refinement, not change.  Congress 
has provided some leadership with the passage of the 2009 
Military Commissions Act,105 but the Executive branch must 
assert leadership.  If this means that President Obama must 
acknowledge successes in the previous Administration, then so 
be it.  The nation is at war, the Commander in Chief must lead 
in accordance with that premise. 
 
 
104. Barack Obama, Remarks at Press Conference (June 15, 2009) 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/issues/Foreign-Policy?page=9 
(“We will continue to pursue a tough, direct dialogue between our two 
countries, and we‟ll see where it takes us.”). 
105. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-07, 
123 Stat. 2190 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.). 
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